The Rise of the Expeditionary Proxy Force
Why Applying Cold War Models For Proxy Warfare is Outdated
Former CIA director James Woolsey, at the end of the Cold War, would deliver a speech about the emerging threats in a post-Cold War world. The most famous quote to emerge from this speech would be: “We have slain a large dragon. But we now live in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes. And in many ways, the dragon was easier to keep track of.” In this case, the dragon refers to the Soviet Union and the snakes to small states and non-state actors. However, one of the major mistakes of this view during the Cold War was that much of the time, one was actually dealing with snakes perceived as part of a larger Communist problem.
Many of the proxy conflicts during the Cold War at the local level were fought more for nationalist autonomy than communist ideology. The call of “workers of the world unite; you have nothing to lose but your chains” would be a far cry from the anti-colonial struggles that actually occurred in places such as Southeast Asia and Africa that were much more particularist than universalist. China actively attempted to integrate Third-Worldist attitudes into its form of Marxism, creating Maoist Third-Worldism and painting itself as a post-colonialist state. In the West this would lead to significant miscalculations with actors such as Ho Chi Minh, who would have favourable views of the US that were drowned out by the global ideological battle, leading the US to side with former French colonial interests in Indochina.
In the wake of the Cold War, the inverse problem would arise. The Global War on Terror era would nominally be seen as a fight against non-state actors, but realistically, there was large state backing of these so-called snakes. Directorate S of the ISI would play a key role in terms of supplying arms and intelligence to the Taliban, and Iran would also play significant roles in backing, funding, and training Shia Militias such as Jaysh Al Madhi and the Badar Corp during the Iraq War. In these hybrid and proxy environments, we have not done a good job at a strategic level of appreciating both patron and client interests, leading to strategic mishandling of on-the-ground dynamics. This nexus of state and non-state groups has not gone away and, in certain ways, has begun to deepen in recent years. Non-state actors, terrorist organizations, insurgent, and guerrilla movements will undoubtedly play a role in the near future, and just because we are currently in the midst of global strategic competition dealing with large state actors, it would be negligent to ignore this phenomenon.
The era of the Global War on Terror would coincide with significant political and technological developments such as the rise of globalism and the internet. Large numbers of jihadist foreign fighters would be mobilized to conduct attacks in their local regions or to join both ISIS and Al Qaeda on the battlefield through remote radicalization. This model is often still highly associated with Sunni Jihadism, but subtly behind the scenes, the same phenomenon would be adopted by state actors providing patronage to groups during this period. As such, this piece seeks to examine this phenomenon and how it has expanded to other actors in recent times.
When one thinks of non-state groups, it often conjures up images of groups such as FARC living in the jungles and conducting hit-and-run attacks on state forces. The reality we face today is much different. Technological developments in mostly civilian and dual-use sectors have enabled non-state groups to level the playing field with state actors. Capabilities such as GPS, quadcopter drones, ATGMs, the internet, social media, and civilian vehicles such as the Toyota Hilux have given these actors the ability to engage in manoeuvre warfare, as well as providing intelligence abilities and the ability to conduct information operations. Both the 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the expansion of the Islamic State show how non-state actors have the ability to contest and hold ground in ways that older guerrilla-style insurgent groups could never do.
These changes have also impacted the nature of patron-client relationships. The most interesting case of proxies in the 21st Century has been the expansion of Hezbollah. Iran’s exploitation of the disenfranchised Shia population in Lebanon has morphed from cobbled-together ethnic militias in the 1982 Lebanon War to the world’s largest and most effective non-state militia in the world, rivalling many state militaries in capability. In 2006, as previously outlined, it would show its ability to go toe-to-toe with the Israeli military, building defensive emplacements with its ties to civil society industry such as the building sector, and combining that with interlocking fields of fire from machine guns and ATGMs to be able to effectively repel Israeli tank columns. At a similar time period, Hezbollah advisors were operating alongside the IRGC in Iraq, training, funding, and commanding Shia militias in the region.
By 2014, however, we witnessed the convergence of these two capabilities as Hezbollah joined the conflict in Syria. The group launched an offensive against the Islamic State and other anti-regime forces, effectively acting as shock troops to bolster the Assad Regime. They were accompanied by Kataib Hezbollah from Iraq, which Hezbollah helped establish during its earlier involvement in Iraq in the early 2000s. Notably, during this period, Iran employed new tactics with the formation of Liwa Fatemiyoun, Liwa Zainebiyoun, and Liwa Al Quds. Unlike previous militias, Iran opted to establish these units from scratch, recruiting Pakistanis, Afghans, and Palestinians and integrating them into dedicated units within Syria.
The mobilization of jihadist foreign fighters has been a cornerstone strategy of groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS. Often, these fighters exhibit greater ideological fervour compared to locals, as highlighted in David Kilcullen’s book “The Accidental Guerrilla”. Similarly, Iranian-backed Shia groups proved to be more combat-effective due to their strong ideological commitment, particularly evident in their defence of Shia shrines in Karbala and Najaf against the Islamic State's attacks on religious and historical sites. Arash Azazi’s' book “The Shadow Commander” further illustrates the devout religious commitment of Quds Force members, many of whom were moved to tears in the presence of these shrines while protecting them. This fervour extended to the militias, shaping a cohesive sense of purpose in both Iraq and Syria, where national identity often takes a back seat to tribal, clan, and religious affiliations.
Many of these units collaborated with Russian forces, including Russian SOF and the Wagner Group, receiving training in conventional manoeuvre warfare. Wagner, in particular, began adopting strategies from the Quds Force, forming groups like the “ISIS hunters” in Syria to counterbalance Iranian influence. This approach was replicated in Mali with the establishment of “Black Wagner” forces, comprising local Malians integrated into Wagner forces, and the recruitment of Serbians for overseas deployments. All three groups saw personnel deployed to Ukraine in support of Russian interests, showcasing an expeditionary capability akin to Iran's proxy strategies.
This form of proxy conflict is expected to persist, with individuals traversing various war zones, reminiscent of movements seen in jihadist circles. The ability of states to deploy proxy forces, honed during the Syrian conflict, underscores the potential for projecting power both regionally and as has been seen with Ukraine globally. The conflict in Ukraine witnessed not only the deployment of Russian proxies but also IRGC advisors operating Shahed drones supplied by Iran. Should ties between Russia and Iran deepen, there is a possibility that groups like Hezbollah may become involved in future conflicts, leveraging Russian support to provide conventional capability against perceived threats, such as those from Israel. As such any grand strategy for this era of great power competition has to take into account the ability for states to insert foreign fighters cross regionally.