The IRGC: Iran's Praetorian Guard
Militaries will always have the largest ability to wield hard power in any society. This will always present a threat to any political regime. However, how different forms of government handle this threat is quite different. The literature on civil military relations notably Janowitz and Huntington focus on democratic regimes but autocratic regimes have their own ways of handling their militaries. As such this piece is going to focus on the Islamic Republic of Iran’s curious way that it leverages the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp as a Pretorian guard for the Ayatollah. The Western notion of the people holding political institutions to account who then in turn hold the military to account does not exist in authoritarian regimes. As such the Iranian example is quite interesting as Iran simultaneously holds some republican institutions as well as being an Islamic autocracy. As such it can shed a lot of light on the civil-military relations of autocratic regimes and how they control their militaries.
The IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp) has a fearsome reputation abroad notably with the Quds force being Iran’s tip of the spear when it comes to its hybrid war operations. However, its domestic impact is often overlooked. To understand this domestic impact, one must look at the history of how the organization was formed. On May the 5th 1979 the IRGC would come into being. This would happen in the backdrop of the Iranian revolution and the overthrow of the Shah. Multiple militias from the Islamist sects of the revolution would be integrated together to create the IRGC. This was done to keep the country from falling apart, re-establish order, prevent an anticipated military coup and crush any remaining pro-monarchist forces. The military remained politically neutral during the revolution, but the more radical elements of the revolution saw it as an inherently counter-revolutionary force and as such purged large numbers of the officer corp. The IRGC became the counterbalance to the army, and it was an openly ideological organization. In its first year it expanded from 6,000 to 100,000 members showing how vital it was to Ayatollah Khomeini.
In 1980 the Iran-Iraq war would begin giving a new role for the fledgling organization. This meant that the IRGC could consolidate its domestic power as the army was distracted fighting the Iraqis. Early 1980 would see multiple coup attempts prior to the war and as such the danger was omnipresent to the new regime. This would lead to a few common themes in the domestic context that would become part of the IRGC’s remit. These are competition with other security institutions, walking the line between ideology and strategic effect, and the consolidation of domestic power to fight external threats. Both the experience of the Iran-Iraq war and the Iranian Revolution would create the organization’s current responsibilities in the domestic sphere.
As well as having a role in keeping the army in check the IRGC serves as a way to keep the population in check. The organization is split into five separate branches the ground forces, navy, air force, Quds force and the Basij force. The Basij Force is a civilian militia and according to the Iranian government it is an NGO that operates based on the true will of the people. It is however part of the IRGC and as such operates based on the orders of the government. The organization acts simultaneously like a political party and a militia. Only a small group is armed and acts like similar militias such as the “Fedayeen Saddam” in pre 2003 Iraq. The other members act as the “electoral foot soldiers” of the regime. The organization is used for both hard and soft state control by attacking threats to the regime or using propaganda and surveillance. The organization has come under severe scrutiny in recent years for their treatment of protest movements that they have been tasked with suppressing. In 2009 Amnesty International would put out a press release demanding that Iran stop using them to quell protests due to their brutal nature. This demand has however not been heeded and as such Iran has continued to use this militia in the recent protests in the wake of the death of Mahsa Amini.
As such this presents a conundrum when it comes to the use of this organization. As it is designed to keep both the population and the military in check there is no group designed to keep the IRGC in check. As such Iran is slowly beginning to face an identity crisis. The line between Islamic theocracy and military dictatorship is beginning to blur. Despite the fact that the Ayatollah is still the Supreme Leader the clerics are losing power to IRGC officers. In the wake of the 2009 protests the US tried to engage in talks with Iran’s clerical class but the power in the nation had shifted under their feet. These talks were fruitless as the IRGC was the true power pulling the strings.
The strong bonds that formed between former head of the IRGC Qasem Soleimani and Ayatollah Khamenei had seemed to tighten the grip that the IRGC has had on Iranian domestic politics. However, Soleimani’s assassination by the Trump administration in 2020 has thrown this somewhat into disarray. Iran’s economic crisis has been adding fuel to the fire when it comes to the challenges that the IRGC faces. The IRGC’s ascendency to its current powerful state would happen at the same time that Iran’s economy would grow exponentially due to the lifting of sanctions under the JCPOA. This would end up with the IRGC commanding around two thirds of Iran’s GDP in its shadow budget. As the Trump administration would come into office and pull out the JCPOA sanctions would be reimposed under the new “maximum pressure” campaign. The IRGC’s budget has not shrunk however in line with Iran’s economic downturn. The government’s handling of the Covid 19 pandemic and youth protesting are all combining to create a dangerous mix of discontents that are eroding the legitimacy of the IRGC. An organization that originally was designed to hold the military to account is now becoming an unaccountable military force that has its influence spread across society. A French statesman Count Mirabeau is often claimed to have described the Prussian state as an army with a country and if one is to look at the share of GDP that the IRGC wields this is certainly the case with Iran.
It is curious how applicable some of the literature on civil-military relations through a democratic lens is to the situation that Iran is facing. Samuel P Huntington makes the argument in his seminal piece “The Solider and the State” that the professional duty of the officer corps in the military is to stay above politics as this commands respect amongst the political class. However, in Iran this is quite the opposite. Soleimani prior to his death would act simultaneously as a politician, diplomat, and military officer. Taking part in both domestic politics and the civil sphere was as such not uncommon. In 1999 students would launch the largest protests in decades in Tehran. These would be supported by Iranian president Mohammad Khatami. In response to these some high-ranking commanders of the IRGC with Soleimani at their head would pen an open letter to Khatami stating the following.
“Dear Mr. Khatami, how long do we have to keep shedding our tears, having our hearts tarnished, and keep watching as the ‘practice of democracy’ brings chaos and insults?” the letter read. “Should we keep our revolutionary patience to the point of losing our regime?” In closing, it said: “Our patience has come to an end. Unless something is done, we can’t bear this anymore.”
This would swiftly lead to the protests coming to an end and Khatami to back down. It is clear that the mere veiled threat that something was going to be done was enough to crush any dissent against the IRGC and the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Escribà-Folch, Böhmelt, and Pilster argue in their article “Authoritarian regimes and civil–military relations: Explaining counterbalancing in autocracies” that personalist regimes need to preform counterbalancing in order to remain in power. This involves ensuring that military forces feel that their survival is inextricably linked to that of the authoritarian ruler. With the above example it is unclear what the IRGC stood to lose when it came to student protests and as such, they must have been acting not to protect their own interests but to protect the image of the Ayatollah. There is no indication that these commanders had been ordered to do this and as such to have a military organization going out of its way to actively protect the regime when it does not need to is the perfect example of the type of authoritarian counter balancing that Escribà-Folch, Böhmelt, and Pilster describe in their piece. As such unlike many other militaries the IRGC does not need to be kept in line by those in power as it is an extension of the power of the regime.
Perlmutter in his article “The Pretorian State and The Pretorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Polities” argues that often militaries do not want to intervene in domestic affairs but instead domestic leaders will turn to the military to try and help them solve domestic disputes when institutions fail. In order to quell factionalism, the political leaders will begin to indoctrinate their militaries toward their form of thinking. In the case of Iran it is difficult to say if this is the case as it is somewhat a chicken and egg scenario. The IRGC was already an organization of radicals prior to its official forming and cases such as that of Soleimani overriding Khatami appear to have been done without the interdiction of Khamenei. On the other hand, the institutional culture in the IRGC has to have forms of indoctrination throughout training to indoctrinate the next generation. As such it is hard to tell of Perlmutter’s analysis in this case fits the situation in Iran.
Outside of the authoritarian literature there are still some parallels that can be made to democratic civil-military relations. Huntington and Janowitz both advocate professionalism in military ranks, but Janowitz’s view may be more applicable to the case of Iran. One can have many qualms with the members of the IRGC, but one would not call them “unprofessional”. Janowitz argued that a good military officer has a more pragmatic professionalism. This involves officers having more of a rounded ability to overlap with their civilian counterparts. This would not go as far as being able to tell elected politicians what to do but none the less the role that Soleimani would take is similar to the sort of role that Janowitz had in mind. He however also advocates for forms of civilian control such as the power of the purse being invested in civilian government and having rivalries between branches of the military.
It is clear that some elements of Janowitz’s forms of control are in play in Iran. The rivalry between the Artesh (Iranian Army) and the IRGC is still very much at play in the modern context. Aside from the historical differences there are still many forces that ensure rivalry. The first of this is doctrinal the Artesh is a traditional military and is designed to fight in conventional manoeuvre warfare style combat. The IRGC on the other hand fights in unconventional and revolutionary warfare. Despite the fact that the Army has higher numbers the IRGC gets precedent when it comes to funding and equipment. This does not however always go in one direction. The IRGC’s air force is under the command of the army’s air force. The Artesh is also under much more direct civilian scrutiny than the IRGC is. This includes attempts by the clerical class to infiltrate the army and conduct ideological indoctrination of its members. It is clear that the IRGC is more trusted than the army but there are also practical considerations as to why it is favoured. Due to the fact that Iran mostly conducts hybrid operations around the Middle East the IRGC is more useful for the regime to project its power. However, the Artesh’s special forces being deployed to Syria shows that this may be beginning to change.
An assumption that is often made when it comes to authoritarian regimes is that they do not have to consider the opinions of their publics when making decisions. Iran’s current situation in the wake of the killing of Mahsa Amini calls this into question. According to polling done by the Tony Blair institute 76% of Iranians want regime change in the country. This should probably be taken with a grain of salt considering it seems to confirm the biases of the organization conducting the poll as well as the difficulty of gaining reliable polling in autocratic regimes. None the less this still points toward an issue for the regime. As virulent protests rip through the country it presents problems for regime legitimacy. However, prior to these protests support for the IRGC has been high amongst the Iranian population. As of February 2021, a large majority of the population had a favourable view of the IRGC mostly due to their role in fighting the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.
This presents quite a conundrum at first glance. As has been seen throughout this piece the power of the regime lies in the IRGC as such if the government is unpopular how can the IRGC have strong popularity ratings. The answer to this question lies in Iran’s other institutions. Iran’s current president Ebrahim Raisi’s polling numbers are sitting at 28%. As has been previously demonstrated the IRGC has the ability to force presidents to heel if needed. As such this means that the IRGC at least tacitly supports what is being done by the government if it does not intervene. This allows the parliament and president to take the public heat, but the true power lies with the Ayatollah and the IRGC. Whether public opinion matters or not to authoritarian regimes it is clear that the IRGC has shielded itself from this.
The civil-military relations of Iran are one of the most interesting nations to study. A Praetorian organization that was originally designed to hold the military to account can now in certain ways be framed as a military that has taken over most spheres of Iranian political life. On the other hand, the IRGC can also be painted as one of the most effective praetorians to have ever existed. It has kept the Ayatollah in power and has successfully rebuffed any challenge to his rule whether it is from the military, other government actors, external actors or the people themselves. It is a brutal tool of oppression that is used to quell domestic decent and spread Iran’s influence on the world stage. The question of how effective comes down to one’s interpretation of the word “civil”. If one sees this as civil society the IRGC has no ability to be held to account by the general public on the other hand if one interprets this as the civilian parts of government, it does an effective job of protecting the power of the most important figure in Iranian politics.
When it comes to civil military relations literature there are throughlines that can be made between different forms of governments. Despite talking about democratic regimes some of the tactics that are advocated by Janowitz are in use by Iran to keep a check on both the Iranian army and the IRGC. It remains to be seen however the impact that the domestic population could potentially have on the IRGC and the Ayatollah. Indications seem like they are in a better position than it would seem given the ongoing protests, but time will tell. Overall, the organization is a worthwhile case study to look at the nature of authoritarian civil-military relations as well as helping to challenge some of the assumptions that are made in the West of the most effective ways to hold militaries to account.